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KOREAN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS: READY TO 
TAKE ON ONE OF THE WORLD’S LARGEST PRIVATE 
REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS? 
Joon H. Kim† 
Abstract: The South Korean government designated three new Free Economic 
Zones in an effort to become the financial and logistical hub of Northeast Asia.  One of 
these zones, the Incheon Free Economic Zone (“IFEZ”), will encompass 209 square 
kilometers of completely new development on reclaimed land and is said to be the 
biggest real estate development project currently in the world.  China started using 
economic zones much earlier in history and although China experienced economic 
benefits, it also experienced severe environmental degradation in its highly successful 
special economic zones.  Similarly tremendous economic growth will result from the 
influx of foreign direct investment into IFEZ, which is likely to result in some 
environmental harm.  This Comment argues that with such high levels of concentrated 
development, the existing South Korean environmental regulatory system will not to be 
able to protect the natural environment within the IFEZ.  Although many Korean 
environmental regulations were modeled after proven Western regulations, the Korean 
regulatory regime requires improvements.  The current Korean environmental regulatory 
system is inadequate because of poor enforcement, narrow definitions of judicial standing 
and justiciability for purposes of judicial review, inadequate judicial remedies, and 
inadequate environmental laws.  Comparison with U.S. environmental regulations 
provides evidence that South Korean environmental regulations lack mechanisms to 
adequately protect South Korea’s natural resources.  This comparison also shows some 
areas of the Korean environmental regulatory system that require change.  Without 
government effort to enhance the effectiveness of existing regulations, South Korea will 
likely face the grave environmental degradation that China experienced.  South Korea 
should make necessary changes to create a better regulatory system.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Korea1 is building a new master-planned city on reclaimed lands with 
all new infrastructure, a six-mile bridge, and one of Korea’s tallest buildings 
at 65 stories.2  A new convention center, system of canals, world-class golf 
course, a mix of office, residential, and office buildings, and large civic and 
                                           
†
  Juris Doctor and Master of Urban Planning expected in 2007, University of Washington, School 
of Law & College of Architecture and Urban Planning.  The author would like to thank Professor Joel 
Ngugi for his valuable guidance and suggestions on this Comment.  The author would also like to thank the 
editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their hard work and commitment.  Any errors or 
omissions are author’s own. 
1
   For purposes of this comment, “Korea” refers to the Republic of Korea, also known as South 
Korea. 
2
   Keun-Min Bae, Incheon Opens Doors to N-E Asia & Beyond, KOREA TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at 11, 
13. 




smaller pocket parks are also part of Korea’s plans for this new city.3  This is 
the Songdo City, a self-sufficient metropolis that will be big enough to 
support 487,000 people, advancing Korea’s plan to increase its international 
competitiveness.4  Songdo City is one of three cities planned as part of the 
Incheon Free Economic Zone (“IFEZ”).5  The Korean government 
designated the IFEZ in an effort to become a regional economic hub in 
Northeast Asia.6   
The IFEZ was established in August 2003 by the Act on Designation 
and Management of the Free Economic Zones (“The FEZ Act”).7  As the 
country’s first FEZ, the IFEZ is located close to the Incheon International 
Airport.8  Two months after the passage of the FEZ Act, the Korean 
government added two more FEZs: Pusan/Jinhae and Gwangyang.9  
Developing Free Economic Zones is one of Korea’s “key strategies to 
prepare for the era of Northeast Asia,” a region that is emerging as a global 
economic powerhouse, with a population four times that of Europe, and a 
twenty percent share of the world’s gross domestic production.10  As part of 
a strategy to counter increased competition from other countries in the global 
economy, Korea launched a program of developing FEZs.11   
With such a large scale development at Songdo,12 the Korean 
government is also likely to face tremendous environmental challenges.  
Korea may suffer the same severe environmental degradation that China 
experienced, which resulted from explosive population growth and 
economic development in the Chinese special economic zones (“SEZs”) 
                                           
3
   See Andrew Salmon, Breaking Ground on a Korean Bid to Rival Shanghai, INT’L HERALD 
TRIBUNE, Nov. 12, 2004. 
4
   See Bae, supra note 2, at 11, 13. 
5
  Id. at 11.  
6
  Free Economic Zones to Attract $5 Billion in 2005, KOREA TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005. 
7
   Act on Designation and Management of Free Economic Zones, Statutes of the Republic of Korea, 
vol. 13, ch. 1, art. 1, Act No. 6835 (last amended through Act. No. 7349) [hereinafter The FEZ Act].    
8
   See Florence Lowe-Lee, Economic Trends, KOREA INSIGHT, Oct. 2005, at 2, available at 
http://www.keia.com/2-Publications/2-1-Insight/Insight-October05.pdf. 
9
   Country Commerce South Korea 2004/2005 Main Report, REGULATORY/MARKET WATCH, July 
30, 2004; Lee Hwan-kyun, Incheon Free Economic Zone to Be Gateway to N-E Asia, KOREA TIMES, Feb. 
22, 2004, available at http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/special/200402/ kt2004022217065811460.htm. 
10
   Jeo-yeon Seo, FEZs to Create International Cities, KOREA TIMES, Nov. 19, 2004.  
11
   Id. 
12 
  Salmon, supra note 3.  This Comment will examine potential development impacts to the 
environment only for Songdo City because Songdo City is the first of the three new cities in IFEZ to have 
begun construction and IFEZ is the first of the three designated FEZs.  As of December, 2005, Songdo City 
is under construction with “Phase I” that includes a Convention Center complex and a mixed-use 
retail/residential compound.  The other cities planned as part of the IFEZ are Yeongjong and Cheongna.  
Together, the three new cities will become home to almost one million people.  Development of Songdo 
City itself is currently considered the world’s biggest private real estate development project. 
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during the 1980s.13  China’s SEZs received the greatest proportion of foreign 
direct investment (“FDI”) in China14 which led to exponential economic 
growth.  Along with the economic growth, however, China’s SEZs 
experienced profound environmental consequences.  These SEZs were 
designated in China’s already environmentally distressed regions, which 
intensified the problem.15  For example, the rapid growth of industries and 
population in Shenzhen SEZ led to a significant decline in environmental 
quality such as decreases in air quality, water quality, and waste concerns.16  
IFEZ’s ambitious real estate development plans will similarly face 
tremendous environmental problems due to the IFEZ’s location and size.   
This Comment argues that the existing Korean environmental 
regulatory system is inadequate to protect the fragile ecosystems of the IFEZ 
from this potentially explosive growth.  The Korean environmental 
regulations were modeled after the Western regulations, and while they are 
generally considered effective, these regulations, like their Western 
counterparts, are not perfect.17  The fragility of the natural environment in 
Korea’s FEZs, combined with Korea’s ongoing problems with its 
environmental regulatory regime will hinder fulfillment of Korea’s 
environmental protection goals and result in great environmental 
degradation in its FEZs.  China’s experience is provided as support that 
Korea will face environmental challenges in its FEZs. 
This Comment analyzes the effectiveness of existing Korean 
environmental regulations as applied to the development of Songdo City.  
Part II examines China’s experience with SEZs and the resulting 
environmental degradation, and considers the implications for the future of 
                                           
13
  See Joseph Profaizer, Economic Development and Environmental Law in China’s Special 
Economic Zones, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 319 (1993).  See generally Benjamin Richardson, Is East Asia 
Industrializing Too Quickly?  Environmental Regulation in Its Special Economic Zones, 22 UCLA PAC. 
BASIN L.J. 150 (2004). 
14
  See Richardson, supra note 13, at 156.  Shenzhen SEZ, which is one of China’s first designated 
SEZs, received approximately $20 billion of FDI between 1980 and 2000. 
15
  See Profaizer, supra note 13, at 321. 
16
  See generally Jianfa Shen, Urbanization in Southern China: The Rise of Shenzhen City, in 
PROBLEMS OF MEGACITIES: SOCIAL INEQUALITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND URBAN GOVERNANCE 
(A.G. Aguilar and I. Escamilla eds., 1999), available at http://ihome.cuhk.edu.hk/~b890706/download/ 
P11y1999.pdf (noting that rapid urbanization in Shenzhen have contributed to environmental pollution).  
For additional information regarding environmental degradation in China’s SEZs, see discussion infra Part 
II.  
17
  See Oliver A. Houck, Recent Developments in the Clean Water Act, 1998-1999, A.L.I.-A.B.A. 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. COURSE OF STUDY, Feb. 10, 1999, at 535 (noting the Clean Water Act as a 
prime example of a U.S. environmental regulation which has been praised for its effectiveness, but has also 
had some criticism); William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a 
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537 (2004) (noting that although the U.S. CWA has been very successful, there 
are some flaws in the regulations). 




the environment in Korea’s FEZs.  Part III asserts that IFEZ is likely to 
encounter a great deal of environmental challenges.  Part IV considers 
certain problems of the Korean regulatory environment, specifically the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Act,18 and provides evidence that Korean 
environmental regulations, Korea’s Water Quality Conservation Act19 and 
Coastal Zone Management Act,20  which were modeled after U.S. 
environmental regulations, have many flaws.  Part V examines problems of 
Korea’s environmental regulatory system arising from Korea’s effort to 
increase economic competitiveness.  Part VI makes specific 
recommendations to Korea’s environmental regulatory regime that should 
aid in withstanding environmental pressures of development in the IFEZ.  
This Comment concludes that Korea should adopt new approaches in 
dealing with environmental impacts in its FEZs to remedy potential 
environmental problems that will arise as a consequence of growth in the 
FEZs. 
II. CHINA’S EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT RAPID GROWTH IN SPECIAL 
ECONOMIC ZONES WITHOUT ADEQUATE ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATIONS RESULTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION  
China’s experience with environmental harm resulting from rapid 
growth in its SEZs is a warning that Korea may face similar environmental 
challenges in its FEZs.  China’s Shenzhen SEZ experienced unpredicted 
rates of economic and population growth.  Although the Chinese government 
anticipated environmental challenges in its SEZs and responded by creating 
a regulatory regime aimed at mitigating adverse environmental impact, this 
regime proved inadequate.21  Environmental problems were exacerbated 
when growth occurred at a much faster rate than the Chinese government 
expected.  China was not prepared to overcome environmental challenges 
and suffered grave environmental harm as a consequence.   
                                           
18
  Environmental Impact Assessment Act, June 11, 1993, Law No. 4567. 
19
  Water Quality Conservation Act, Amended by Act No. 7249, Oct. 22, 2004 (also available in 
Statutes of the Republic of Korea, Volume 18, Part 37, Environment (Korean Legislation Research 
Institute)).   
20
  Coastal Zone Management Act of 1999, available at http://www.globaloceans.org/ 
koreanczma.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 
21
  See Profaizer, supra note 13, at 321. 
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A. China Faced Environmental Challenges in Its Special Economic 
Zones Resulting from Unpredicted Rates of Growth 
During the mid-20th century, the Chinese government emphasized 
political and economic concerns.22  As a result, the country experienced 
widespread environmental degradation.23  Although China’s environmental 
awareness grew during the 1970s, economic concerns still dominated policy 
decisions.  Environmental health was not a priority.24  Many heavily 
polluting foreign industries moved into the SEZs despite the Chinese 
government’s statements that they would only welcome industries using 
advanced techniques for pollution control.25 
China has the most extensive array of SEZs in the world and some of 
these SEZs suffered great environmental harm.26  China’s four original 
SEZs—Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, and Xiamen—experienced rapid 
economic development with severe consequences for the environment.  
Shenzhen SEZ’s population exploded from approximately 94,100 in 1980 to 
almost one million by 1992, exceeding projections.27  This explosive growth 
led to numerous landfills, tremendous increases in human and animal waste, 
deforestation, and soil erosion.28  There were problems with inefficient 
energy production and high levels of consumption, which led to air quality 
problems.29  Increased output of untreated wastewater and industrial waste 
led to a decline in water quality.30  Beyond these basic concerns over air, 
water, and noise pollution, China’s SEZs also contributed to concerns 
regarding toxic contamination, increases in blood-lead concentrations, the 
use of genetically-modified crops, and the loss of wetlands.31  These 
                                           
22
  Cai Shouqiu & Mark Voigts, The Development of China’s Environmental Diplomacy, 3 PAC. RIM 
L. & POL’Y J. S-17, S-18 (1993) (noting that China’s past environmental neglect was a result of policies 
that were more concerned with improving living standards and national wealth than environmental 
protection). 
23
   Id. at S-20 (noting that China allowed the development of many factories that took no action 
toward pollution control). 
24
   Id. at S-23. 
25
  Profaizer, supra note 13, at 324. 
26
  Richardson, supra note 13, at 163; see also Shen, supra note 16, at 7. 
27
  Profaizer, supra note 13, at 326. 
28
  Id.; Shen, supra note 16, at 10.  China lost a total of approximately 0.62 million hectares of arable 
land in 1995 alone.   
29
  Profaizer, supra note 13, at 327. 
30
  Id. at 325; Shen, supra note 16, at 12.  The amount of wastewater increased from 136.85 million 
tons in 1990 to over 270 million tons in 1995, partly due from increase in population but as much from 
increase in wastewater discharge per person.   
31
  Richard J.Ferris & Hongjun Zhang, Reaching Out to the Rule of Law: China's Continuing Efforts 
to Develop an Effective Environmental Law Regime, 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 569, 573-74 (2003).   




environmental concerns and problems demonstrate the incredible strain 
unpredictable growth had on China’s environment.   
 Chinese SEZs caused not only local, regional and national 
environmental degradation, but also caused international environmental 
concerns.32  For example, “yellow dust” from China spread across borders, 
reaching Korea, Taiwan, and other East Asian countries.33  This yellow dust 
triggered acid rain in Korea and Japan.34  Chinese SEZs may also be 
contributing to climate change, ozone depletion, and acidification of 
ecosystems.35  China took responsibility for these problems, however, by 
increasing its efforts to reduce the tension between environmental stress and 
economic growth. 
B. China’s Efforts to Improve Its Environmental Regulations Were 
Unsuccessful 
Contrary to the theory that developing countries will often forego 
environmental protection for economic development, Chinese government 
leaders worked to reduce adverse environmental impacts of economic 
growth.36  Despite their efforts in fortifying environmental regulations, 
actual implementation was less successful.37 
China’s national policy for environmental protection began in the 
1970s and 1980s.38  As environmental awareness increased, the government 
instituted more effective environmental controls over its SEZs.39  The 1978 
Chinese Constitutional provision providing for environmental protection was 
codified and China’s first comprehensive national environmental legislation, 
the Environmental Protection Law of 1979, was enacted.  These two laws 
served as a basis for environmental regulation in the SEZs.40  However, both 
laws lacked characteristics essential for an effective environmental 
protection system.41  First, there was a conflict in economic policy and 
                                           
32
  Christopher Brown et al., The Pressure of Industry on Chinese Environment: A Tale of Two South 
China Cities, at 1, http://www.cwu.edu/~nsfreu/s_papers/ewconnectionsrealfinal3chris.doc (last visited Jan. 
22, 2006).  
33
  Howard French, China’s Growing Deserts Are Suffocating Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2002. 
34
   Id.; Chung H. Lee, Toward Economic Cooperation in East Asia 16-17 (The European Inst. of 
Japanese Studies, Working Paper No. 100, 2000). 
35
  Profaizer, supra note 13, at 328-29. 
36
  See Profaizer, supra note 13, at 329. 
37
   Richardson, supra note 13, at 208. 
38
  See China Information-Environmental Protection, http://www.asia-planet.net/china/ 
environmental.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2006). 
39
   Shouqiu & Voigts, supra note 22, at S-27.  
40
  Profaizer, supra note 13, at 333. 
41
   Id. at 334. 
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environmental policy.  Specifically, China refused to recognize that 
economic growth had a direct link to environmental problems.42  Second, the 
constitutional and statutory language failed to keep pace with the ever-
evolving environmental problems of economic development.43  In addition, 
government officials often ignored or loosely construed SEZ laws in order to 
advance rapid development.44  Further, the 1979 law had limited 
enforcement mechanisms.45  Lastly, Environmental Impact Assessments 
were carried out ineffectively.46   
Around the same time, China’s courts were strengthened and as a 
result, courts increased enforcement of environmental pollution laws and 
began to hold foreigners liable for their pollution.47  In 1984, a Chinese court 
required a foreign polluter to control its pollution in accordance with 
Chinese standards and regulations.48  The Chinese legislature also 
strengthened the judiciary’s environmental protection ability by fortifying 
the right of appeals by authorizing formal appeals in the People’s Court.49  
Despite this activism, the judiciary rarely participates in environmental 
enforcement and government authorities often only employ administrative 
and civil actions in enforcement.50 
China also reworked some of the regional environmental authority.  
The first SEZ laws did not make any mention of environmental controls, and 
pollution and environmental degradation continued.51  In 1986, China’s State 
                                           
42
   Profaizer, supra note 13, at 334; see Richardson, supra note 13, at 208-9.  There is an assumption 
behind Chinese environmental law that the economy is a command, or planned, one, where production is 
dominated by state-owned enterprises. 
43
   Profaizer, supra note 13, at 335.  Some of the key legislation for the SEZs did not contain any 
environmental protection measures and lacked specific environmental standards, which made it difficult for 
local officials to enforce laws.   
44
  Id. at 335. 
45
   Id. at 333.  Enforcement power was limited to criticisms, warnings, and assessment of fines 
against polluters.   
46
   Id. at 336-37.  Environmental Impact Assessments were not carried out for smaller projects and 
for larger projects, it was done ineffectively.  For example, The Daya Wan nuclear power plant and the 
Shajiao coal power plant building permits were approved prior to the completion of Environmental Impact 
Assessments.  Id. 
47
  Id. at 339-41; see also Shouqiu & Voigts, supra note 22, at S-28.  In 1984, a Chinese court 
instituted fines, court costs, and forced a Hong Kong manufacturer to replace its equipment that caused air 
pollution.  Id. 
48
   Shouqiu & Voigts, supra note 22, at S-28; see also Profaizer, supra Note 13, at 340.  The 
appellate court in Shenzhen Municipal Shekou District Environmental Monitoring Station v. Kaida 
Enterprises, Ltd., held that Kaida must satisfactorily control its pollution in accordance with standards and 
regulations, and ordered injunctive relief for environmental violations, increasing the enforcement 
mechanisms available which were previously only government-imposed fines.  China’s Supreme Court 
declared this decision as precedent to be followed. 
49
  Profaizer, supra note 13, at 340. 
50
  Id. at 341. 
51
  Shouqiu & Voigts, supra note 13, at S-27. 




Council passed the Provisional Regulations on Environment Management 
for Economic Zones Open to Foreigners, which spelled out the duties of 
foreign companies.52  The 1986 regulations contained SEZ zoning laws 
which provided even greater environmental protection by allowing regional 
authorities to set higher standards than their national counterparts.53  
However, this regulation was not as beneficial to the environment as the 
government envisioned.  The 1986 regulation shifted legal authority to 
regional and local authorities but this “extensive decentralisation of 
responsibilities to municipal authorities . . . contributed to variable and 
inconsistent implementation of environmental regulations in the SEZs.”54  
Further, the regulation lacked definite measures and offered no definition for 
key legal environmental mechanisms.55  In addition, SEZ managing 
authorities lacked the environmental expertise necessary to implement 
effective environmental regulations.56  Lastly, China’s “ubiquitous political 
philosophy . . . [of] grow first, clean up later” also diminished the ability of 
these managing authorities to enforce the regulations.57   
The Chinese government anticipated environmental problems in its 
SEZs and responded by strengthening its regulatory system.  However, these 
efforts had limited success because China’s “seeming successes in 
environmental policy formation have not been matched by policy 
implementation.”58  China’s environmental regulations were generally strict 
and detailed, but China did not have the funding or technology to effectively 
implement these regulations.  As a result, actual environmental protection 
has been a challenge.59  China’s experience provides many lessons for the 
Korean government.  Like the Chinese SEZs, Korea’s FEZs are likely to 
attract great sums of FDI, which has a correlative relationship with 
environmental degradation.  The following section provides a detailed 
analysis of the consequences of FDI-fueled economic growth.   
                                           
52
   Id. at S-28; see also Profaizer, supra note 13, at 341. 
53
 Profaizer, supra note 13, at 342-43. 
54
  Richardson, supra note 13, at 212. 
55
  Id. at 211.  For example, an environmental regulation in Shenzhen SEZ places an obligation to 
preserve environmental sanitation yet it does not offer a definition of what environmental sanitation is. 
56
  Richardson, supra note 13, at 209. 
57
  Id. at 153 (internal quotations omitted). 
58
 Id.  
59
   Shouqiu & Voigts, supra note 22, at S-18-19. 
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III. SOUTH KOREA IS LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER MANY COMPLEX 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES IN IFEZ AND MUST ASSESS ITS 
REGULATORY CAPACITY TO ADDRESS THESE THREATS 
Korea’s FEZs are prime candidates for receiving FDI, which has been 
shown to be a contributory factor to environmental degradation in host 
countries.60  Because Korea is strategically located within Northeast Asia, an 
area that receives high levels of FDI, its FEZs are likely to be successful in 
attracting FDI.  The sheer size of Korea’s development plans in its FEZs, as 
demonstrated through Songdo’s development plan, will create tremendous 
environmental challenges.  Further, FDI fuels growth in FEZs at 
unpredictable rates and result in greater environmental harm than anticipated 
by the government.61  Without improvements to Korea’s environmental 
regulatory program, ecosystems of the IFEZ are threatened by FDI and 
accompanying explosive growth. 
A. Northeast Asia Is a Prime Region for Economic Growth and Korea Is 
Ideally Located to Benefit from SEZs 
Northeast Asia is emerging as the third biggest trading region in the 
world along with the European Union and the North America Free Trade 
Association.62  The Northeast Asian economy, consisting mainly of China, 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, accounts for approximately twenty percent of the 
world’s Gross Domestic Product.63  Additionally, as a growing region, 
Northeast Asia is a magnet for foreign investment and attracts more FDI 
than any other developing country region.64  As the region grows, countries 
are in a race to increase their economic competitiveness.65    
SEZs are an effective means to increase economic competitiveness.  
There are many types of SEZs, reflecting “different philosophies, objectives, 
and means of achieving them.”66  SEZs vary depending on its adopted 
                                           
60
  Nicola Borregaard & Annie Dufey, Environmental Effects of Foreign Investment Versus Domestic 
Investment in the Mining Sector in Latin-America, OECD Global Forum on International Investment—
Conference on Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment (2002). 
61
  Shen, supra note 16, at 13.  For example, China’s Shenzhen SEZ grew at unpredicted rates and 
faced many negative environmental effects.  
62
   Kab-Won Oh, Changes in the NE Asian Business Environment and the Policy Direction of the 
Free Economic Zones, http://www.fez.go.kr/dbcon/down.php?file_int=119&code=e03 (last visited Jan. 21, 
2006). 
63
   Hyo-sik Lee, N-E Asian Economic Hub Within Grasp, KOREA TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004.   
64
  See Richardson, supra note 13, at 156. 
65
   See Oh, supra note 62 (“Singapore has its Industry 21 Plan, and Taiwan has its Asia Pacific 
Regional Operation Center goal. . . . China the touted “factory of the world” which has been growing over 
8% a year is not seeking to repeat its success in manufacturing in logistics”).   
66
   Richardson, supra note 13, at 161. 




models, infrastructure subsidies, investment conditions, and special or 
exempt regulations.67  SEZs are designated by host countries with a primary 
objective of attracting foreign investment to aid their economic growth.68  
This legislative scheme has been widely used around the world.  In 1987, 
there were about 175 SEZs worldwide but by the late 1990s, the number had 
more than quadrupled to about 850 such zones.69  The increased popularity 
of SEZs as a way to further economic growth indicates that SEZs have had 
success in accelerating economic growth.70 
The Korean government recently passed the FEZ Act, which 
encapsulates Korea’s efforts to become a Northeast Asia economic hub.71  
This Act shows the government’s continued commitment to using SEZs as a 
tool for economic development.  The purpose of The Act on Designation and 
Management of Free Economic Zone is to “facilitate foreign investments, 
bolster the national competitiveness and seek the balanced development 
among regions by improving the management environment for foreign-
invested enterprises and living conditions for foreigners through the 
designation and management of free economic zones.”72  This Act created 
three FEZs: Incheon, Pusan/Jinhae, and Gwangyang.73  The Korean 
government expects that these FEZs will attract foreign investment and aid 
Korea in becoming a Northeast Asia economic hub.74 
These Korean FEZs are likely to succeed because of Korea’s strategic 
location between China and Japan, and its proximity to the resource-rich 
Russian Far East.75  In addition, this Act provides many incentives including 
tax incentives, government subsidies (including cash grants), relaxed 
regulations, enhanced administrative services, and the establishment of 
foreign schools and medical facilities.76  Further, these Korean FEZs will 
                                           
67
   Id.  
68
   See Bala Ramasamy & Venus T. Viana, ASEAN’s Foreign Direct Investment into the People’s 
Republic of China, Discussion Paper No. 95.12, Sept. 1995, http://econ.massey.ac.nz/publications/ 
discuss/dp95-12.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).   
69
   Richardson, supra note 13, at 160. 
70
  See generally Profaizer, supra note 13 (documenting China’s experience of tremendous growth in 
its SEZs); Richardson, supra note 14 (noting East Asian countries, like China, has had economic success in 
its SEZs).  
71
  Min-hee Kim, Revisions Inject New Dimensions in Foreign Economic Zones, KOREA NOW, Apr. 
30, 2005. 
72
  The FEZ Act, supra note 7. 
73
  Lee, supra note 63. 
74
  Korean Real Estate Information Center, Applicable Laws: Act on Designation and Operation of 
Free Economic Zones, http://www.kreic.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).    
75
  See Lee, supra note 63.  
76
  INCHEON FREE ECONOMIC ZONE, Investment Guide, http://ifez.go.kr/eng/sub5/a_body.asp (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2006). 
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feature “business friendly environments, attractive tourist destinations, and 
state of the art logistical and industrial facilities.”77   
Because of its strategic location and FEZ incentives, Korea is likely to 
attract huge sums of foreign investment in its FEZs, which in turn is likely to 
fuel uncontrollable rates of economic and population growth.  IFEZ has 
already attracted billions of dollars within Songdo City, including a 
committed $12.7 billion investment by the U.S.-based Gale Corporation.78  
Uncontrollable growth is likely and without proactive environmental 
management, IFEZ will suffer from environmental harm.    
B. Foreign Direct Investment in Special Economic Zones Leads to 
Environmental Degradation in Host Countries 
One of the main purposes of SEZs is to attract FDI,79 which often has 
a profound impact on the environment.80  Countries seek FDI despite the 
danger of negative environmental impacts because FDI has positive effects 
on the host country’s economic growth.81  Evidence suggests that an 
“inverted-U” relationship exists between pollution and economic 
development, called the “Environmental Kuznets Curve.”82  In the beginning 
stages of economic development, environmental degradation tends to be 
high, but as the host country’s economy matures, the rate of environmental 
degradation slows.  This change of eventual improvement following initial 
environmental deterioration reflects a country’s increased demand for 
environmental protection.83  Eventually, as a host country’s economy 
develops, environmental regulations are strengthened, and the influx of 
environmentally protective technology slows pollution.  However, studies 
                                           
77
   Id. 
78
  Gale Company: American Entrepreneur Investing $12.7 Billion in New Songdo City, KOREA IT 
TIMES, Aug. 2004, available at http://ittimes.co.kr/en/node.asp?em=M&mcode=200408&subcode=L20& 
idx=114. 
79
   See Mark Yaolin Wang & Xiaochen Meng, Global Local Initiatives in FDI: The Experience of 
Shenzhen, China , ASIA PACIFIC VIEWPOINT, Aug. 2004, 181, 183 (Chinese government has attempted to 
direct FDI to its SEZs).   
80
  ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY COMMITTEE, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, Environmental Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment: A Literature Review 7 (2002).  
Countries seek FDI even though it may have negative environmental impacts because FDI has direct 
positive effects on the host country’s economic growth.  Id.   
81
  Id. 
82
   Id. at 11. 
83
  Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the Environment, 110 Q.J. ECON. 
353, 369-70.  There is no evidence that would suggest that economic growth unavoidably harms the natural 
environment, but there is an association of economic growth with deteriorations in environmental 
conditions in poorer countries.  Id. 




conflict as to the true effects of FDI on the environment.84  This is because 
the environmental effects from activities of foreign investors are hard to 
separate from the domestic effects and cannot be analyzed independently 
from other related factors.85  Environmental effects from economic 
development are studied by looking at “scale effects (effects from expansion 
of economic output), structural effects (effects from changes or reallocation 
of production and consumption), and technology effects (spill-over effects 
from technological development and diffusion).”86  Scale effects generally 
tend to be negative, whereas the technological and structural effects tend to 
be positive.87  However, overall environmental quality is measured by “net 
effects.”88  While opinions differ, evidence indicates that the net effects of 
FDI are “often an accomplice to environmental degradation.”89  Altogether, 
economic growth is associated with deteriorating environmental conditions 
in poorer countries.   
Korea has been described as a newly industrialized country90 and is 
currently known to have high environmental awareness.91   With its stronger 
environmental regulations, modeled after regulations in the United States, 
Korea is poised to avoid the destruction witnessed in China’s SEZs.  
However, many challenges exist for Korea, particularly the inability to 
                                           
84
   ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY COMMITTEE, supra note 80, at 10. 
85
   Id. 
86
  Id.  Net effects are the cumulative effect of scale effects, structural effects, and technological 
effects.  Borregard & Dufey, supra note 60, at 9.  Other studies have also considered FDI effects on the 
regulatory and policy environment.  Id. at 17.  FDI is expected to put an upward, positive pressure on the 
host country’s environmental regulations and policies. 
87
  Richardson, supra note 13, at 197. 
88
   ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY COMMITTEE, supra note 80, at 10-22; see also Borregard & Dufey, 
supra note 60, at 8-9.  “Scale effects” are measurements of environmental impact resulting from 
incremental increases in economic activity.  As trade and investment expand, the use of natural resources is 
also expected to increase.  Generally, scale effects are expected to be negative.  “Technological effects” 
measure effects from new or better technologies that arrive at a host country as a result of FDI.  
Technological effects are expected to be generally positive, or at a minimum, neutral, because technologies 
of advanced countries are often more efficient, pollute less, and consume fewer resources.  “Structural 
effects” refer to changes in patterns of economic activity.  They tend to be positive since FDI generally 
“promote[s] allocative efficiency among economies.”  Essentially, this means that “goods will be produced 
with lower input and capital per unit of output world-wide.”  In developing countries there is a recent 
structural shift toward service and away from resource processing, which is regarded as particularly 
beneficial from an environmental perspective.  Id. 
89
  Richardson, supra note 13, at 199 (internal quotations omitted). 
90
  George Curran, Pacific Rim Environmental Regulation: A Western Perspective of Several 
Countries’ Environmental Liability Laws, 3 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 47, 56 (1994). 
91
  The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/kr (last visited January 22, 2006); United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Virtual Conference, Korea’s vision making 
process, http://www.unescap.org/drpad/vc/conference/bg_kr_13_kvm.htm (last visited January 22, 2006); 
see also Joon Hyoung Lim & Shui-Yan Tang, Democratization and Environmental Policy-Making in 
Korea, 15 GOVERNANCE 561, 566 (2002) (noting that civic organizations in Korea have been active in 
cultivating public’s awareness of environmental problems).   
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effectively implement its environmental regulations.  Environmental 
regulations are only effective if they are well-administered and implemented 
in a manner adequate to achieve their goals.  Effective implementation is 
hindered when a country is unwilling to control its development in order to 
lessen its environmental harms.92  Many developing countries, like China 
and Mexico, have neglected environmental protection and instead took steps 
to stimulate economic development in the past.93  By identifying the flaws in 
Korea’s current environmental regulatory regime, the following section 
argues that Korea, if it follows China’s lead, faces the same potentially 
negative environmental consequences.   
C. The Proposed Plan of Songdo City Demonstrates that Severe 
Environmental Stresses Are Likely 
Songdo City is the first city to be developed under IFEZ and is the 
centerpiece of the IFEZ.94  All of the three Korean FEZs are along the 
coastline.  Songdo City will be built on reclaimed lands and will become 
home to approximately 487,300 people upon completion.95  The construction 
of this new city will occur over approximately ten years and is projected to 
end in year 2020.96  As with any new development, the construction of 
infrastructure, including systems of roads and utilities, is required.  
Environmental challenges with Songdo City are greatly multiplied by the 
fact that development will occur on miles of shoreline within Incheon Bay.97  
Shorelines are delicate ecosystems, which once disturbed, are hard to 
restore.98  Development brings human, agricultural, and industrial pollutants 
                                           
92
  Shouqiu &Voigts, supra note 22, at S-17. 
93
   See L. Ortiz-Lozano et al., Environmental Evaluation and Development Problems of the Mexico 
Coastal Zone, in OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 48, 161 (2005); see also Shouqiu & Voigts, supra note 22, at 
S-27. 
94
  See generally Bang Hee-seok & Park Keun-sik, Factors to Be Considered for Improving Free 
Economic Zone in Korea, http://faculty.washington.edu/karyiu/confer/xian05/papers/bang.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2006). 
95
   Soh-jung Yoo & Je-hae Do, Incheon Free Economic Zone Key to Korea’s Hub Dream, KOREA 
NOW, Aug. 23, 2003, available at http://kn.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2003/08/23/ 
200308230007.asp. 
96
  INCHEON FREE ECONOMIC ZONE, Directions of Development, http://ifez.go.kr/eng/sub4/ 
a_body.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 
97
  See Charles W. Finkl & Steve L. Krupa, Environmental Impacts of Coastal-Plain Activities on 
Sandy Beach Systems: Hazards, Perception and Mitigation, J. COASTAL RES., SI 35, 132 (2003); see also 
Ortiz-Lozano, supra note 94; Dong Oh Cho & Stephen B. Olsen, The Status and Prospects for Coastal 
Management in Korea, 31 COASTAL MGMT. 98, 98-199 (2003).  Korea’s western coast borders the Yellow 
Sea, which, although one of the world’s most productive fishing grounds, has seen significant decline in 
recent years. 
98
  A. Chidi Ibe, The Coastal Zone and Oceanic Problems of Sub-Saharan Africa, in SUSTAINING THE 
FUTURE: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (George Benneh, 




which increase over time as an area grows.99  Further, Korea’s coastlines 
have been exposed to huge reclamation projects in the past and currently 
about forty percent of all tidal areas have been destroyed by reclamation.100  
Incheon Bay is already environmentally stressed from the reclamation work 
for IFEZ and the recent development of the Incheon International Airport.101  
Other problems include habitat destruction, decline in water quality, loss of 
natural resources, loss of aquatic species, and health hazards from waste, 
etc.102  Songdo will face tremendous environmental challenges during 
development, and perpetual environmental pollution is likely to occur.103  
Additional development of Cheongna and Yeongjong will only amplify 
those impacts within Incheon Bay.   
Consequently, water quality and coastal management are two large 
issues in development of Korea’s FEZs.  Korea’s Water Quality 
Conservation Act (“WQCA”) and Coastal Zone Management Act (“Korean 
CZMA”) are based on the U.S. Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and the Coastal 
Zone Management Act (“U.S. CZMA”), which are recognized as effective 
environmental regulations in the United States.  However, an assessment of 
Korea’s current environmental regulatory regime and a comparison of 
Korea’s WQCA and CZMA with United States’ equivalent CWA and CZMA 
reveal inadequacies in Korea’s laws. 
IV. KOREA MUST ASSESS ITS CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY 
REGIME AND CONSIDER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. LAWS UPON 
WHICH IT IS MODELED 
Korea’s environmental regulatory regime has undergone significant 
changes and currently has a number of good regulations in place, modeled 
after U.S. regulations.  Both the Basic Environmental Policy Act and the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Act were patterned after U.S. provisions.  
Despite this fact, the Korean environmental regulatory system still has some 
                                                                                                                              
William B. Morgan & Juha I. Uitto eds., 1996), available at http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/ 
80918e/80918E0p.htm. 
99
   Id. 
100
  Chul-Hwan Koh, The Korean Tidal Flats: Reclamation vs. Conservation, KOREAN FEDERATION 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT NEWS, Summer 1998, Issue 1. 
101
  John Kasarda, Asia’s Emerging Airport Cities, URBAN LAND ASIA, Dec. 2004, available at 
http://japan.uli.org/pdf/ula_mag_feature_p18.pdf (IFEZ is being developed on reclaimed land); Airport 
Technology, Incheon International Airport, South Korea, http://www.airport-technology.com/projects/ 
incheon/ (last visited May 20, 2006) (Incheon International Airport was developed on reclaimed lands). 
102
  See  Ortiz-Lozano et. al., supra note 93.  
103
 Michael Kennish,, Environmental Threats and Environmental Future of Estuaries, 29 ENVTL. 
CONSERVATION 78, 78-107 (2002) (Environmental challenges will result from shoreline development and 
related growth).   
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areas which require improvement.  A comparison between Korea’s WQCA 
and CZMA with the U.S. CWA and U.S. CZMA shows deficiencies in 
Korean environmental regulatory system.   
A. Korea’s Existing Environmental Regulatory System Appears to Be an 
Effective System but It Lacks Adequate Implementation   
Korea’s environmental regulatory regime did not take off until 
Koreans were faced with severe environmental challenges.  After the Korean 
War, the Korean government was primarily concerned with economic 
development and less with environmental concerns.104  Having achieved 
great economic prosperity since the War, public concerns over their 
environmental surroundings and how it affected their quality of life 
increased in Korea.105  This resulted in a strong political demand for better 
environmental protection measures106 and an increased effort to address the 
country’s growing environmental problems.107  Korea’s past environmental 
laws were generally ineffective.108   
Currently, the backbone of Korean environmental regulation is the 
Basic Environmental Policy Act (“BEPA”),109 which closely tracks the 
United States’ National Environmental Policy Act.110  It sets forth “general 
principles, fundamental policies, and an administrative framework for 
environmental preservation and remediation.”111  Under the umbrella of 
                                           
104
  Richard J. Ferris, Jr., Aspiration and Reality in Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore:  
An Introduction to the Environmental Regulatory Systems of Asia’s Four New Dragons, 4 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 125, 159-60 (1993); see also Hong Sik Cho, Law and Politics in Environmental Protection: A 
Case Study on Korea, 2 J. KOREAN L. 103 (2002) (hereinafter Cho, Law and Politics in Environmental 
Protection). 
105
  Cho, Law and Politics in Environmental Protection, supra note 104, at 48. 
106
  Id.   
107
  Hong Sik Cho, An Overview of Korean Environmental Law, 29 ENVTL. L. 501, 503 (1999) 
(hereinafter Cho, An Overview of Korean Environmental Law).  As a first step, the Korean government 
reworked the existing environmental regulations in place and developed new laws modeled after that of the 
United States.  Id.  At the same time, the Ministry of Environment (“MOE”) was established in place of the 
Environmental Administration, and had full ministry status.  See Ferris, supra note 104, at 162-3.  
Comprised of bureaus that delegate most duties to regional subunits, the MOE is a “network of related 
entities which implement MOE’s policies with difficulty and are frequently hindered by a general lack of 
cooperation from other ministries.  Ferris, supra note 104, at 161. 
108 
 Cho, An Overview of Korean Environmental Law, supra note 107, at 505.  Korea’s first 
environmental laws, the Pollution Prevention Act and the Environmental Protection Act, were ineffective 
primarily due to the lack of enforcement.  The Pollution Prevention Act was ineffective because it lacked 
an administrative agency to oversee and enforce its regulations.  The Environmental Protection Act, 
enacted in 1977 and providing for both administrative and criminal sanctions, lacked strict enforcement.  
Id. 
109
  Basic Environmental Policy Act of 1990, No. 4257. 
110
  Id. at 505-6.  
111
  Id. at 507.  




BEPA are national and local environmental regulations which are more 
specific, targeting environmental areas such as air and water quality, and 
solid waste.112  BEPA also includes in its definition of “environment,” noise, 
vibration, and odor, etc.113  These specific environmental regulations remain 
in effect as long as they are consistent with BEPA.114  BEPA contains a strict 
liability standard for polluters and allows national and local governments to 
establish environmental quality standards.115   
Korea’s Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIA”) is one of the 
major problems with Korea’s environmental regulatory system.  The EIA 
originated from the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.116  The 
Environmental Conservation Act of 1977 established the Environmental 
Impact Assessment procedure.117  The EIA went through several reforms, 
and in 1993, it became an independent law as the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Act.118  The EIA Act has been revised many times in order to 
make it a more effective regulation but several observations point to the 
conclusion that the Act has not been as successful.119  In particular, 
economic development policies have received much attention while 
environmental protection policies have received less.  This had the effect of 
undermining the Korean environmental regulatory system. 
One major problem with the EIA Act is that those preparing the EIA 
are the people that are undertaking the project; this reduces objectiveness 
and fairness is not guaranteed.120  The second problem lies with scoping and 
reviewing of the environmental impact statements.121  Generally, because of 
other responsibilities, the EIAs are often not reviewed by a committee 
formed under the EIA Act or a recommended group of experts.122  In 
addition, the EIA consultation process is problematic and has only been 
                                           
112
  Id.  
113
  Jiwhan So, Environmental Law of Korea, INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 
at KOR-17 (Robinson, Nicholas ed., 2000). 
114
  Cho, An Overview of Korean Environmental Law, supra note 107, at 505.   
115
  Id.  
116
  So, supra note 113, at 19. 
117
  See Richardson, supra note 13, at 189. 
118
  JAEYONG CHOI ET AL., KOREA ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE, Comparative Study on the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Between the Republic of Korea and China—In Case of Golf Courses, at 
WO-05 (2003); So, supra note 113, at 19.  Environmental Impact Assessment, prior to becoming enacted as 
a separate act, was one chapter of the Basic Environmental Policy Act.   
119
  So, supra note113, at KOR 19-20. 
120
  Id. at KOR-19.  In the U.S., the Environmental Impact Statements are prepared under the 
supervision of and in consultation with government agencies. 
121
  Id.  
122
  Id. 
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implemented at a rate of fifty-seven percent.123  Lastly, the EIA suffers from 
government’s policy placing priority on development rather than the 
environment.124  One example of government’s failure with the EIA can be 
seen through the Shi-Hwa project.  The Korean EIA Act requires that the 
assessment be prepared by the time of public notice.  However, the EIA for 
the Shi-Hwa lake project was prepared nine months after public notice.125  
After spending over two-thirds of a billion dollars on the project, the water 
quality of the lake deteriorated beyond repair, and the Shi-Hwa lake project 
was scrapped.126   
In an effort to address these issues and improve its environmental 
administrative system, Korea adopted the Administrative Procedures Act 
(“APA”) in 1998.  The APA allows private citizens to participate in various 
government activities, a legislative effort which is the first of its kind in 
Korea.127  By enacting the APA, the Korean government is showing its 
willingness to increase its environmental responsibility.  However, the APA 
is useless without effective implementation and administration. 
B. A Comparison of the Korean Water Quality Conservation Act with the 
United States’ Clean Water Act Reveals Deficiencies in the Korean Act   
The United States’ Clean Water Act of 1972128 is considered to be the 
United States’ most effective and resilient pollution control law.129  The 
CWA has facilitated a great deal of progress in water quality since its 
enactment.130  Rivers and lakes that were once polluted have become 
recreational spots for picnicking, boating and other waterfront related 
activities.131  The CWA has also been successful in reducing the rate of 
wetland loss and reducing the amount of oil spills into U.S. waters.132   
                                           
123
  Id. at 20. 
124
  Id.  
125
  Cho, Law and Politics in Environmental Protection, supra note 104, at 54 (emphasis added).  The 
EIA process for the Shiwha project was nothing but a sham and “reveals how backward environment-
related law practice has been” in Korea.  Id. 
126
  Id.; see also Manik Hwang, Coastal Land-Use Change By Reclamation of Tidal-Flats Along the 
Western Coast of the Capital Region in Korea, at 6, available at http://www.cger.nies.go.jp/lugec/ 
Proceedings/12)Manik%20Hwang.pdf.  Shi-Hwa, a freshwater lake newly created through a 12.4 kilometer 
dike, had deteriorated in water quality to a point beyond repair due to uncontrolled inflow of wastewater to 
a point beyond repair.  The dike was broken and the Shiwha lake water was discharged into the ocean.  Id.  
127
  Cho, An Overview of Korean Environmental Law, supra note 107, at 511. 
128
  Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-97, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (2000).   
129
  See Andreen , supra note 17, at 537.   
130
  Industry discharges have been reduced and dissolved oxygen levels have increased all over the 
country.  Id. at 591.  
131
  Id. at 591-2. 
132
  Id. at 592. 




However, the CWA has also been criticized.133  One of the biggest 
criticisms is that the CWA has not achieved its principal goals: It has not 
eliminated all discharges into water and has not created fishable and 
swimmable waters throughout the United States.134  The CWA’s failure to 
achieve its goals results from a number of factors.  Permit compliance is 
inconsistent and many industrial facilities fail to meet pretreatment 
standards.135  In addition, the CWA also does not address non-point source 
pollution136 and “[a]s a consequence, non-point source pollution has evolved 
into the largest single obstacle to improving water quality.”137  Another large 
problem with water quality is one of hydrologic modification,138 which the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has deemed the second 
leading source of water quality impairment for United States rivers, lakes, 
and streams.139  
The structure of administering the CWA also presents challenges.  In 
the CWA, federal agencies have a dominant role in regulation but state 
agencies retain rights such as water allocation.140  This results in legal 
differences between water quality and water quantity; water quality is now 
managed by federal agencies under the CWA but water quantity remains an 
area of law under state control.141  Consequently, the EPA lacks programs or 
requirements that would effectively integrate water allocation as part of a 
comprehensive water quality program.142  Additionally, individual states 
have not addressed this problem and regulate water quality and quantity 
through different agencies without much communication or cooperation.143  
                                           
133
  Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning From More than Five-And-A-Half Decades of Federal Water 
Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 578 
(2005). 
134
  Id. at 578; see also Reed D. Benson, Pollution Without Solution: Flow Impairment Problems 
Under the Clean Water Act Section 303, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 199, 265 (2005) (internal quotations 
omitted) (“The CWA has not achieved its primary objective of restoring and maintaining the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”). 
135
  Andreen, supra note 17, at 537. 
136
  Id. at 543. 
137
  Andreen, supra note 17, at 593.  The CZMA authorizes states to regulate non-point pollution 
sources but CZMA jurisdiction is limited to coastal waters and do not extend to freshwater bodies.  See 
Paul L. Sorisio, Poultry, Waste, and Pollution: The Lack of Enforcement of Maryland’s Water Quality 
Improvement Act, 62 MD. L. REV 1054, 1061 (2003). 
138
  Hydrologic Modification, http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/nps/pdf/va_hydrologicmodification.pdf  
(last visited Feb. 23, 2006).  Hydrologic modification is the modification of stream flow by human 
activities.   
139
  Benson, supra note 134, at 201. 
140 
 33 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (2006); see Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerations for Water 
Law, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1018-19 (2005). 
141
  Id.  
142
  See Benson, supra note 134, at 204-05. 
143
  Id.  
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Overall, while water quality in the United States has improved as a result of 
the CWA, problems still remain.144   
A close analysis of Korea’s WQCA shows that the Korean regulation 
has problems similar to the CWA.  On the surface, the WQCA appears to be 
a good, effective law.  The purpose of the WQCA is to preserve public health 
and prevention of environmental harm from water pollution.145  The WQCA 
specifies permissible discharge standards and requires permits from the 
Ministry of Environment (“MOE”) for the installation of discharge facilities 
(both wastewater and non-wastewater) and preventive facilities.146  The 
WQCA also allows the MOE to assess non-compliance charges, to suspend 
operations of discharge facilities if inspections indicate that the facility 
exceeds its allowed discharge totals, and to revoke permits.147  Chapter IX of 
the WQCA provides for penal provisions for failure to comply with the 
Act.148  The WQCA addresses non-point source discharges but limits its 
scope only to the usage of agricultural chemicals and specifies that certain 
agricultural chemicals cannot be used in golf courses.149  The Enforcement 
Decree for the WQCA150 provides for designation, computation of daily 
discharge, exemptions, inspections and reports, and most importantly, 
delegates authority to regional subunits with supervision from MOE.151   
Although the WQCA appears to be a good water conservation law in 
general, it still has problems similar to the CWA.  It does not adequately 
address non-point source pollution because its scope is limited to the use of 
agricultural chemicals in golf courses.  In the United States, non-point 
source discharge has become one of the biggest contributors to water quality 
                                           
144
  Mark F. Sudol & Richard F. Ambrose, The US Clean Water Act and Habitat Replacement: 
Evaluation of Mitigation Sites in Orange Country, California, USA, 30 ENVTL. MGMT. 727-734 (2002).  
The regulation of wetlands per section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act and section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act has had limited success in implementation.  Mitigation of wetlands as authorized by the CWA 
has not had much success since mitigation sites are usually not successful.  Lack of successes in mitigation 
sites result from lack of information and insufficient understanding of wetland functions, and also from 
inadequate compliance efforts by regulatory agencies.  A study using quantitative evaluation in California, 
U.S.A., found that mitigation sites in a study area resulted in the loss of 126 hectares of wetlands, with only 
72 hectares of the mitigation considered successful.  The same study using qualitative evaluation showed 
that only 26 hectares of the mitigation sites were successful after 126 hectares of wetlands were lost to 
development projects. 
145
  So, supra note 113, at KOR-22. 
146
  WQCA, supra note 19, arts. 8-11. 
147
  Id. arts. 17, 19, 20. 
148
  Id. ch. IX. 
149
  Id. arts. 46-2, 47.  
150
  Enforcement Decree of the Water Quality Conservation Act, Amended by Presidential Decree No. 
18796, Apr. 22, 2005 (hereinafter Enforcement Decree of WQCA).  Also found in The Statues of Republic 
of Korea, Volume 18, Part 37, Environment (Korea Legislation Research Institute).   
151
  Id.   




problems.  Similar to the CWA, the WQCA does not address water quantity 
in the regulation of water quality.152  Inadequate consideration of water 
quantity in the regulation of water quality has been a problem in both the 
United States and Korea.  Additionally, enforcement and administration of 
all environmental regulations has been problematic in Korea.153  
C. The Korean Coastal Zone Management Act, Which Was Modeled After 
the United States’ Coastal Zone Management Act, Is Inadequate to 
Protect Korea’s FEZs Against Environmental Harm 
The United States’ Coastal Zone Management Act aims to protect 
estuaries and coastal wetlands, provide public access to shores, mitigate 
negative impacts of coastal development, and accommodate different coastal 
uses.154  The U.S. CZMA is a model of good balance in integrating distinct 
but complementary roles for federal, state, and local governments in 
achieving coastline protection.155  This management style is known as 
“cooperative federalism,” whereby states voluntarily assume much of the 
administrative and enforcement responsibilities.156  Under the U.S. 
CZMA,157 states are responsible for developing a state Coastal Zone 
Management Plan (“CZMP”) according to the guidelines of the U.S. 
CZMA.158  The U.S. CZMA also does not provide for a private right of 
action for a federal agency’s failure to meet the consistency requirements.159  
Similarly, the U.S. CZMA does not provide state agencies with a right of 
action to sue private citizens who act without the approval of a federal 
permit for activities in coastlines.160   
Implementation of the U.S. CZMA has been problematic as well.  
Since the CWA does not regulate non-point source pollution, Congress 
attempted to force states to manage non-point source pollution in 1990 by 
withholding state funding unless they were in compliance with this new 
                                           
152
  See WQCA, supra note 19. 
153
  For discussion on problems of Korean environmental law, see discussion supra Part IV. 
154
  See Edward M. Cheston, An Overview and Analysis of the Consistency Requirement Under the 
Coastal Zone Management Act, 10 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 135, 136 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).   
155
  Lynne Z. Hale, Achieving Integration in Coastal Management: The Challenge of Linking National 
and Local Levels of Government, http://www.crc.uri.edu/download/HAL_0020.pdf (last visited May 20, 
2006). 
156
  Cheston, supra note 154, at 136 (Congress left some control to the states because coastal 
management was traditionally an area regulated by state authority). 
157
  Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-65 (2000). 
158
  16 U.S.C. § 1455 (setting forth the guidelines of the Act). 
159
  Cheston, supra note 154, at 146.  Private citizens can, however, bring an action under a different 
legal theory. 
160
  Id. at 145. 
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CZMA provision.161  However, even a decade after the enactment of this 
provision, only a few states have created and adopted non-point source 
pollution control measures.162  The success of this provision in the CZMA is 
unclear.163   
Similarly, comparing the Korean Coastal Zone Management Act of 
1999 (“Korean CZMA”) with the U.S. CZMA shows that Korean 
administrative and implementation procedures need to be amended.  Korea’s 
coastal areas face many environmental pressures.164  There is a high demand 
for coastal developments, like the IFEZ, although they often lead to the loss 
of wetlands, declining water quality and declines in fisheries.165  
The Korean CZMA was adopted in 1999 and gave the Ministry of 
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (“MOMAF”) jurisdiction over all coastal 
areas.  However, within the “terrestrial zone,” which includes all shorelines 
extending 500 meters inland from the mean high watermark166 (one 
kilometer from where the shoreline has been developed into harbors, ports 
and industrial complexes), MOMAF does not have a direct regulatory 
function, but only a coordinating and planning function.167  The Korean 
CZMA regulates via a three-tier system involving the National Coastal Zone 
Management Plan (“CZMP”), regional CZMP, and the Coastal Zone 
Readjustment Plan.168  The National CZMP was mandated by legislation to 
be developed within a year of the enactment of the Korean CZMA.169  
Within the framework of the national CZMP, local and regional governments 
can voluntarily elect to develop regional CZMPs.170  If the local or regional 
governments do not elect to do so or do not have the resources to develop 
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their own CZMPs, MOMAF will develop a regional CZMP171 that identifies 
actions to enhance and restore the coastal areas.172 
Korea’s CZMA is criticized for its centralized approach.  The Korean 
CZMA allocates responsibility among different levels of government but has 
not been successful in making such allocation effective and efficient.173  The 
approach does not provide for the explicit delegation of power and authority 
to local and regional governments.174  Local governments have limited 
resources and are given minor roles.  From their point of view, further 
coastal development is desirable because that will provide for a larger 
economic base.175  Another major shortcoming of the Korean CZMA is the 
restriction in its jurisdiction.176  This Korean CZMA is limited to areas 
below mean high water marks, and the regulations of coastal development 
on terrestrial areas belong to a different government agency, the Ministry of 
Construction and Transportation.177  Another limitation of the Korean CZMA 
is the CZMPs’ questionable authority over other relevant laws or plans 
which were implemented before the CZMPs came along.178  There are 
several regulations which explicitly or indirectly deal with coastal areas but 
there is a lack of direction regarding which law or plan has greater 
authority.179   
V. KOREA MUST RE-PRIORITIZE ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS OVER 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ORDER TO MAKE EXISTING 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS EFFECTIVE  
Although Korea is more concerned about the environment today and 
greater public awareness and participation in environmental affairs exists, 
Korea still emphasizes economic development over environmental vitality.  
Asian exporting industries fear that higher environmental standards threaten 
their international competitiveness.180  However, economic studies do not 
provide solid empirical support for this belief.181  Although tough 
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environmental regulations can impede or discourage FDI in some industries, 
it is not appropriate to conclude that FDI alone dictates the direction of FDI 
flow.182  Despite this indefiniteness, politicians and business people continue 
to firmly believe that strict environmental regulations will hurt economic 
competitiveness.183  As a result, the Korean government is often influenced 
away from active enforcement of its environmental regulations. 
Since the 1960’s, the Korean government has been committed to 
improving its national economy and increasing its per capita income.184  In 
order to “accelerate economic growth, the government placed the first 
national priority on the development of industrial bases.”185  Korea’s desire 
to advance economically contributed to tremendous environmental 
deterioration186 because Korea ignored environmental protection.187  A recent 
reclamation project demonstrates Korea’s continuing preference for 
economic development over environmental health.  The “Saemangeum” 
project, which was an effort to convert tidal flats into large farmlands, had 
tremendous negative environmental consequences.188  Despite 
environmental concerns related to this dike construction project,189 the 
Korean government in 2001 pushed ahead with this reclamation project 
because it was unwilling to cancel a project that was over seventy percent 
complete, and towards which the government invested over one billion 
dollars.190   
Korea’s policy to advance economic development is also indicated by 
the lack of environmental regulations specific to Korea’s SEZs and newly 
created FEZs.  Korea lacks environmental regulation specifically for its 
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SEZs, including the newly designated FEZs.191  Instead, it relies on existing 
environmental regulations to guide development in the FEZs without 
additional considerations.  There is also some evidence that environmental 
standards may be waived or overlooked for investments within the SEZs.192  
Despite such evidence, the FEZ Act still provides that the “possibility of 
securing the environmentally sound and sustainable development” is a 
matter to be considered by the FEZ committee.193  It provides that a plan for 
an FEZ must include a “program for environmental preservation.”194  On the 
other hand, the Korean legislature permits authorities to reduce or waive any 
environmental impact assessment levies, charges, or fees.195  Similarly, 
approval by the Minister of Finance and Economy supersedes other 
environmental or planning approvals.196  These provisions by the Korean 
government put the environment at grave risk and displace any other 
environmental protection measures in place.197   
VI. KOREA MUST CAPITALIZE ON THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM CHINA’S 
SEZS AND THE U.S. CWA AND CZMA IN ORDER TO MITIGATE THE 
POTENTIAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IN KOREA’S FEZS 
Korea can take actions to reduce the potential for environmental harm 
in IFEZ by avoiding the mistakes made by the Chinese and implementing 
effective environmental regulations specific to FEZs.198  A greater emphasis 
on environmental protection rather than economic development would also 
aid in reducing environmental harms.  Korea should also amend its WCQA 
and CZMA in order to avoid the inadequacies revealed in the U.S. CWA and 
CZMA.  Finally, Korea should address:  1) inadequate implementation; 2) 
narrow definitions of standing in environmental actions; 3) problems with 
judicial review; and 4) inadequate remedies in environmental actions.  
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A. Korea Must Take Specific Actions to Avoid the Environmental 
Degradation Experienced in China’s SEZs 
In order to avoid the environmental degradation experienced by 
China’s SEZs, the Korean government must take some bold steps towards 
strengthening its environmental regulatory system.  One of the problems 
with China’s SEZ was lack of expertise in its environmental managing 
authorities.  Korea, similar to China, has a decentralized system of 
environmental regulation and some evidence of non-enforcement of 
environmental regulations in the FEZs.199  Korea must require high 
standards of expertise in environmental managing authorities and carefully 
monitor the effects of decentralization.  In addition, Korea does not have a 
system of environmental regulations specifically for its FEZs.  China 
developed a system of regulations putting greater environmental protection 
measures for its SEZs.  Similarly, Korea should assess the need for stronger 
regulations in its FEZs and if necessary, develop new regulations targeted 
towards development in the nation’s FEZs.   
B. Korea Should Place a Greater Emphasis on Environmental Protection 
and Less on Economic Development 
Korea is an industrializing nation with potential for further economic 
growth.  Growing importance exists over environmentalism, following the 
country’s experience with environmental degradation during its industrial 
growth era.  Although growing environmentalism is positive, it is 
insufficient.  As a country with high levels of environmental awareness, 
Korea must reconsider its priorities and place greater importance on 
environmental protection.  Korea’s governmental authorities should 
recognize that stringent environmental regulations do not hinder economic 
growth and act responsibly in protecting its vulnerable ecosystem. 
C. Korea Should Amend Its WQCA and CZMA in Order to Avoid the 
Inadequacies Revealed in the U.S. CWA and CZMA  
Part IV examined the deficiencies in two of Korea’s key 
environmental regulations for its FEZs, the WQCA and the Korea CZMA, 
by comparing them with the U.S. CWA and CZMA, the models for Korean 
regulations.  This section makes specific recommendations to improve the 
effectiveness of Korea’s two key environmental provisions for its FEZs.   
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Korea’s water quality program and the coastal management program 
need to be amended to address existing problems that hinder the 
achievement of water quality and coastal protection goals.  Expanding the 
WQCA to regulate broader areas of non-point sources of pollutant 
discharges and including the regulation of water quantity as an additional 
method of water quality management is essential in order to maintain and 
improve Korea’s water quality.  Further, integrating all laws that impact 
coastal areas under the MOMAF is mandatory, and incentives should be 
given so that local governments can participate in national and regional 
CZM plans.  Korea should also develop efficient cooperative models 
between all agencies that have jurisdiction in coastal areas.  Another option 
would be to extend MOMAF’s regulatory authority over coastal 
development projects which are currently under the jurisdiction of different 
ministries.  This type of gradual strategy is crucial to overcoming both legal 
and government agency barriers to coastal protection.   
D. Korea Must Effectively Implement the Environmental Regulations 
Already in Place 
Korea has well-developed environmental regulations, but its 
administrative practice in implementing environmental regulations is not as 
developed.200  Korea does not implement environmental regulations to the 
same extent as developed countries, and this may have disastrous results.201  
There is a huge concern because “even if the legislature passes 
environmentally ambitious legislation, the bureaucracy vitiates its goal by 
administrative practice.”202  An example of this occurrence is clearly evident 
in the Saemangeum project.203  This reclamation project received much 
criticism and opposition because the government pushed ahead with the 
controversial despite their awareness that creating a freshwater lake posed 
environmental problems and were aware of public criticisms.  The Ministry 
of Environment and many environmental groups opposed this project.204  
Korea should improve its implementation of environmental regulations 
through better coordination and a concerted effort between different 
governmental agencies. 
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E. Korea Must Broaden the Definition of Citizen Standing in 
Environmental Actions 
One of the greatest challenges of Korean environmental regulation is 
the lack of opportunities for citizen participation.205  Korea must allow for 
additional opportunities for citizen participation by broadening its standing 
requirements and by granting citizens additional rights to intervene in 
government actions.  
Korea’s judiciary system, with its unclear jurisprudence regarding 
citizen standing in environmental suits, contributes to the poor 
environmental regulatory regime.206  Though the right to a healthy 
environment is a Constitutional right,207 the Constitution does not provide 
for concrete and direct civil rights automatically, making it difficult to 
determine what and who is protected.208  Korean courts use the legal interest 
test for standing, which means that a plaintiff who seeks legal redress for 
environmental harm must demonstrate some type of specific injury to his or 
her own legal interest.209  Standing is “so narrowly formulated that any 
litigation to vindicate collective interest is not allowed.”210  Thus, unless an 
environmental statute contains protections for private individuals, a citizen 
or the general public cannot bring suit and seek judicial review for 
environmental harm.211  In the United States, this problem is mitigated by 
important and effective statutory provisions for citizen suits.212  However, 
Korea’s regulatory system lacks similar provisions.  Relaxing standing 
requirements to citizens and environmental groups allows such groups to 
bring enforcement actions and increase the efficiency of environmental 
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regulations.213  Korea should adopt new provisions giving citizens increased 
standing in environmental suits. 
F. Korea Must Broaden Its Definition of Justiciability for Purposes of 
Judicial Review 
In addition to increasing citizen standing, Korea must provide the 
public with additional opportunities to intervene in governmental actions.  
Because a government agency’s environmental determination will be subject 
to judicial review only if it involves an “administrative disposition,”214 it 
further complicates judicial enforcement.  An example of an administrative 
disposition is when a government agency exercises public powers, like 
rejecting development permit applications.215  When a government agency is 
using its private powers, like purchasing a fleet of cars for government use, 
it is not subject to judicial review.216  This has been problematic since 
Korean courts have held that environmental impact assessments are an 
exercise of private power, not subject to judicial review.217  This means that 
the only time that a private citizen can bring a suit for an environmental 
disposition is when an agency makes a final disposition on the project.  
Typically, by that time, the proposed project is likely to have been completed 
or is at least nearing completion.218  At such time, a citizen suit would be 
useless.  Another problem is that courts are very deferential to agency 
decisions.219  This is disadvantageous to the public and makes victory in 
environmental suits difficult.  Providing the means for the public to 
intervene in government actions before environmental harm is done is 
necessary for a better environmental regulatory system in Korea. 
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G. Korea Must Enact Sufficient Judicial Remedies in Environmental 
Actions  
Korea does not have adequate judicial remedies available to 
environmental victims and must develop a system to compensate those who 
are harmed.220  Because the right to standing in an environmental suit is 
limited, citizens have attempted suits under tort or nuisance claims.  
However, because the environmental regulatory system requires that injury 
be demonstrated to bring a suit under these theories, citizens whose property 
was not directly harmed cannot bring a suit.221  Further, as a civil law 
country, Korea does not award unforeseen extraordinary, nominal, or 
punitive damages.222  Injunctive relief is also unavailable in the Korean legal 
system,223 as are class action suits and jury trials.224  Korea should address 
this problem through the enactment of new laws or changes in its judicial 
system to award better compensation and injunctive relief for environmental 
harm already caused and for foreseeable harm.   
In order to increase the quality of life for all its citizens, Korea must 
take bold steps towards strengthening its environmental regulatory system.  
Any new environmental legislation or amendment to existing regulations 
must be supported by better administration and implementation, and it must 
improve the citizen participation process in Korea’s environmental affairs.  
Citizens and environmental groups must be granted increased standing to 
bring a claim for both government and private actions which degrade the 
environment.  Along with broadening standing requirements to citizens and 
environmental groups that show a great interest in environmental protection, 
Korea should also adopt stronger administrative regulations that would 
efficiently enforce environmental regulations.  Making the changes 
recommended in this section should lessen the potential for environmental 
destruction and increase likelihood that Korea’s environmental regulatory 
system will be effective against the development pressures of IFEZ and all 
other existing and future Korean FEZs. 
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This comment has argued that as part of the IFEZ, Songdo City is 
likely to experience tremendous rates of FDI-fueled economic growth, and 
as a consequence, there will be many environmental challenges with the 
development of the IFEZ.  As examination of Songdo City demonstrates, 
there are many environmental issues which must be addressed in 
development of Korea’s FEZs.  Further, Korea must keep in mind that 
growth in the FEZs may greatly exceed projections, as was the case in 
China’s SEZs.   
Korea’s FEZs, unlike the Chinese SEZs, are supported by a better 
environmental regulatory system, but Korean environmental regulations are 
still inadequate.  There are major problems with Korea’s environmental 
regulatory regime, including lack of enforcement, narrow definition of 
judicial review and standing, inadequate remedies, and gaps in some key 
environmental regulations.  Although environmentalism is growing in 
Korea, a national policy towards economic development further exacerbates 
Korea’s environmental problems.  Considering that such an environmental 
regulatory system is being tested against the world’s biggest real estate 
development project at Songdo, tremendous environmental degradation is 
likely to occur if the identified problems are left untreated.   
Korea must re-assess its current environmental regulatory system and 
make the necessary changes to its regulations, policies, implementation 
methods, and the judiciary.  Only when these improvements are made will 
the environmental regulatory regime in Korea be effective against 
environmental challenges brought on by the development of Songdo City, 
IFEZ, and the remaining FEZs. 
 
